Publications -

Amandine Catala. 2025. The Dynamics of Epistemic Injustice: Situating Epistemic Power and Agency. Oxford University Press (forthcoming, in press)

(2024) “Epistemic Injustice” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Natalie Stoljar)

(2024) “Breaking the Stigma Around Autism: Moving Away from Neuronormativity Using Epistemic Justice and 4E Cognition” With Mylène Legault and Pierre Poirier. Synthese

(Forthcoming) “Epistemic Injustice or Epistemic Oppression?” Conversations on Epistemic Injustice, KULA

(Forthcoming) “How Not to Solve the Double Empathy Problem: Neurodiversity Lite and the Fake(d) Empathy Problem” With Marjorie Désormeaux-Moreau. The Double Empathy Reader. Ed. Damian Milton

(2023) “Les injustices épistémiques dans La Conversation des Sexes” Philosophiques 50 (2): 317-327

(2023) “Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Authority on Autism” À paraître dans The Bloomsbury Guide to Philosophy of Disability. Dir. Shelley Tremain

(2022) “Academic Excellence and Structural Epistemic Injustice: Toward a More Just Epistemic Economy in Philosophy” Journal of Social Philosophy (online first): 1-24

(2022) “Academic Migration, Linguistic Justice, and Epistemic Injustice” The Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (3): 324-346

(2021) "Autism, epistemic injustice, and epistemic disablement: a relational account of epistemic agency" Avec Luc Faucher et Pierre Poirier, Synthese: 1-27

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-021-03192-7 Abstract The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people.

(2021) “Echo Chambers, Epistemic Injustice, and Ignorance.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (3): 30-37.

(2021) “Towards an Epistemic Evaluation of Think Tank Ecosystems: The Case of Epistemic Justice.” With Andréanne Veillette and François Claveau. Critical Perspectives on Think Tanks: Power, Politics and Knowledge. Ed. Julien Landry. Edward Elgar

Abstract This chapter contributes to a more general research programme on the social epistemology of think tanks by exploring the issue of how the production and transmission of knowledge by think tanks can best be evaluated. Most evaluations of think tanks take each organization as a unit. The goal of the assessment becomes a ranking of organizations according to a set of criteria meant to capture what an ideal think tank would look like, most often in terms of impact or transparency. Although organizational-level evaluations can be valuable, we propose to evaluate think tanks at the level of ecosystems rather than at the level of individual organizations. Moreover, whereas existing evaluations conflate excellence with concerns such as ‘impact,’ we propose to evaluate them on the basis of their epistemic excellence. Thus, with the help of examples from Canada and elsewhere, this chapter illustrates how think tanks can be evaluated as ecosystems and on epistemic grounds. This chapter also concentrates on one specific component of epistemic excellence: the ways in which think tanks can hinder or foster epistemic justice. The chapter first lays out the benefits of an ecosystemic evaluation, then explains how a conception of epistemic excellence can apply to think tank ecosystems before exploring characteristics of ecosystems that can be conducive or detrimental to epistemic excellence. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781789909227/9781789909227.00022.xml

(2020) “Metaepistemic Injustice and Intellectual Disability: A Pluralist Account of Epistemic Agency” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23: 755-776

Abstract The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-020-10120-0

(2019) “Multicultural Literacy, Epistemic Injustice, and White Ignorance” Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2): 1-24

Abstract: The traditional blackface character Black Pete has been at the center of an intense controversy in the Netherlands, with most black citizens denouncing the tradition as racist and most white citizens endorsing it as harmless fun. I analyze the controversy as an utter failure, on the part of white citizens, of what Alison Jaggar has called multicultural literacy. This article aims to identify both the causes of this failure of multicultural literacy and the conditions required for multicultural literacy to be possible. I argue that this failure of multicultural literacy is due to hermeneutical injustice and to white ignorance. I close by considering possible avenues for fostering multicultural literacy. https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/7289

(2015) “Democracy, Trust, and Epistemic Justice” The Monist 98 (4): 424-440

Abstract: I analyze the relation between deliberative democracy and trust through the lens of epistemic justice. I argue for three main claims: (i) the deliberative impasse dividing majority and minority groups in many democracies is due to a particular type of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘hermeneutical domination’; (ii) undoing hermeneutical domination requires epistemic trust; and (iii) this epistemic trust is supported by the three deliberative democratic requirements of equality, legitimacy, and accountability. In arguing for those claims, I contribute to the conceptualization of both epistemic injustice and domination, as well as to discussions of trust and deliberative democracy. https://academic.oup.com/monist/article-abstract/98/4/424/2563424